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CONFLICT CERTIORARI: Is THE SUPREME COURT OF
FLORIDA FOLLOWING ITS CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE?
ELLEN CATSMAN FREIDIN*
This article considers potential changes in the Supreme Court of
Florida's conflict certiorari jurisdiction. After examining the in-
consistent manner in which the court has interpreted its own
jurisdiction, the author discusses ameliorative alternatives.
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I. INTRODUCTION
[Florida must have] a plan to restrict jurisdiction of the Su-
preme Court in order that there might not be any possibility of
merely offering two appeals, one to the district court of appeal
and one to the Supreme Court, and thereby making litigation
even more costly and prolonged.'
With this goal in mind the Judicial Council of Florida drafted
the 1956 amendment to the Florida Constitution which created the
district courts of appeal, streamlined the court system and deline-
ated the new jurisdiction of the supreme court.' The primary impe-
tus to the creation of Florida's new courts was threefold: (1) the
supreme court, heretofore the court of primary appellate jurisdic-
tion in the state and the court of last resort, was overburdened;3 (2)
the overburdening was causing lengthy delays;' and (3) the long trip
* Florida Developments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF FLORIDA, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1954).
2. FLA. CONST., art. V (1885, amended 1956).
3. Pennekamp, A Personal Obligation, 30 FLA. BAR J. 136 (1956); Gardner, Effective
Court System Necessary for a Great and Growing State, 30 FLA. BAR J. 141 (1956).
4. Gardner, supra note 3.
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to Tallahassee (then and now the seat of the court) was proving
costly and time consuming to litigants5 and their attorneys, espe-
cially those in the southern part of the state. In fact, these problems
were making the pursuit of appeals a luxury that only the wealthy
could afford.' Furthermore, there was serious concern that overbur-
dening and delays were causing compromise in the quality of justice
the supreme court was producing.7
The district courts of appeal were created with the idea that in
the majority of cases they would be courts of final appellate jurisdic-
tion, that is, courts of last resort. As such, their decisions would be
the laws of the state. The Supreme Court of Florida was given
primary appellate jurisdiction only in a small number of narrowly
defined cases and was given the power to grant various extraordi-
nary writs, including writs of certiorari.' The scope of each of the
constitutional grants of supreme court power is quite limited. As
noted, the Judicial Council wanted to limit a litigant's opportunity
for a second appellate review in the supreme court if a district court
had finally determined a case. Provisions for review were included
where the appellate court decision affected a class of constitutional
or state officers, passed upon a question certified by that court to
be of great public interest or was in direct conflict with a decision
of another court of appeals or the supreme court on the same point
of law.9 The supreme court was to have a supervisory role in relation
to the appellate courts. In that vein it was charged with ensuring
harmony among their decisions. This power to cure conflict was the
most flexible and discretionary of the court's jurisdictional grants.
Even before the constitutional amendment was passed, legal
scholars and interested observers voiced fears that the provision
allowing the court to solve decisional conflict would "doubtless...
be the basis in many instances for a second review from the Courts
of Appeals"'" rather than strictly a means of producing harmony.
5. Pennekamp, supra note 3.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b). The following types of cases may be appealed directly from
the trial court to the supreme court: those imposing the death penalty; those passing on the
validity of a state statute or a federal statute or treaty or construing a provision of the state
or federal constitution; and, when provided by law, those imposing life imprisonment or
involving validation of bonds or certificates of indebtedness. The court may only review
decisions of the district courts of appeal by certiorari in certain enumerated instances. It also
may issue writs of prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus and may review
administrative actions as provided by law.
9. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
10. Barns, Courts, Lawyers and Taxpayers, 30 FLA. BAR J. 162, 165 (1956). Barns was a
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One writer foresaw the possibility that wealthy litigants would use
the inherent flexibility of the conflict certiorari provisions as a
"delaying tactic . . . designed to enforce compromises.", It seemed
certain that if district court decisions were to have convincing final-
ity, "[t]he Supreme Court must establish itself, by stern conduct
in receiving appeals, as the steadfast opponent of such practices."'"
Two decades after the creation of the district courts and the
redefinition of supreme court jurisdiction, the problems which led
to the 1956 changes are recurrent. Most fears voiced prior to passage
of the amendment have proved justified. The court is again overbur-
dened. One justice "has nightmares about the court burden-not
because he minds work, but because he thinks it is hurting the work
product, justice." 3 Moreover, in two decades the court has not
found it possible (or perhaps desirable) to establish clear and consis-
tent guidelines for determining when a conflict exists. The absence
of clearly defined guidelines makes application for a writ of certior-
ari on the ground of conflicting decisions an uncertain endeavor at
best. The resulting confusion has caused Justice England to call for
"the abolition of. . .conflict jurisdiction, as well as the other enu-
merated classes of discretionary review, in favor of the federal model
which . . .gives the United States Supreme Court complete and
unfettered discretion to determine when uniformity is not essen-
tial.""4
This article will consider potential changes in the constitutional
grant of jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of Florida, and in the
appellate rules, in light of the current court burden and the court's
twenty year failure to cope with conflict certiorari in a consistent
and unified manner. Supreme court interpretations of its own juris-
dictional powers will be examined. Alternatives, including those
suggested by Justice England, will be discussed.
retired supreme court justice and a University of Miami Law Professor at the time he wrote
the article.
11. Pennekamp, supra note 3.
12. Id.
13. Miami Herald, May 1, 1977, § AA at 5, col. 1. The justice referred to was Justice
Arthur England. See England & McMahon, Quantity Discounts in Appellate Justice, 60
JUDICATURE 442 (1977).
14. Florida Greyhound Owners and Breeders Ass'n v. West Flagler Assoc., 347 So. 2d 408,
412 (Fla. 1977) (footnote omitted).
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II. INTERPRETATION OF THE CONFLICT CERTIORARI PROVISION OF
FLORIDA CONSTITUTION ARTICLE V, SECTION 3(b)(3).
A. Pre-Foley
Perhaps in answer to concerns voiced prior to the passage of the
1956 constitutional amendment, early decisions by the Supreme
Court of Florida set out a strict constructionist approach toward the
grant of certiorari to resolve decisional conflict. In Ahsin v.
Thurston"6 the court resolved that the constitutional "limitation of
review to decisions in 'direct conflict' clearly evinces a concern with
decsions as precedents as opposed to adjudtcattons of the rights of
particular litigants. "6 Following the federal standard, the court
looked forward to limiting the issuance of writs of certiorari to
"cases involving principles the settlement of which is of importance
to the public, as distinguished from that of the parties, and . . .
cases where there is a real and embarrassing conflict of opinion and
authority. ""
Almost immediately, while still espousing concern that it "not
venture beyond the limitations of its own powers,"'" the court was
faced with the question of whether conflict could be found between
a district court per curiam affirmance without opinion and a prior
decision of the supreme court. Holding that the constitutional final-
ity given to the district courts usually precluded the supreme court
from delving into unstated rationale underlying district court opin-
ions, the court stepped back from the federal standard used in Ansin
v. Thurston and outlined an exception to this general refusal. Rei-
terating the necessity of sustaining the dignity of decisions of the
district courts, the court held that if the refusal to consider the
record in a per curiam opinion would create "resulting injustice to
the immediate litigant,""5 the court might look behind the opinion.
This aside by the court in Lake v. Lake, 2 0 left the door open for
a gradual erosion of the principles set forth in Ansin v. Thurston and
reaffirmed in Lake. The court had anticipated that the new court
system would be undermined and weakened without a continuing
assumption that justice had been done at the district level. It had
acknowledged its own responsibility to give those lower courts its
15. 101 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1958).
16. Id. at 811 (emphasis added).
17. Id. (emphasis added, quoting Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, 261 U.S.
387 (1922)).
18. Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1958).
19. Id. at 643 (emphasis added).
20. 103 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1958).
[Vol. 32:435
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fullest respect. But in the same opinion the supreme court gave
itself an opportunity to realize its own misgivings and to disregard
district court decisions when it suspected injustice therein.
This apparent contradiction set the stage for a philosophical
conflict between those who consider the responsibility of the su-
preme court in its supervisory capacity to be to ensure finally that
every litigant in Florida courts receives justice and those who see
supreme court responsibility in a broader light. This latter group
subordinates concern for individual litigants in deference to the
constitutional mandate of district court finality. It sees the supreme
court's responsibility as resolution of conflict only where the appel-
late court decision will have important impact on and cause real
confusion in the decisional law of the state.
After Lake the supreme court made several housekeeping deci-
sions regarding the new conflict certiorari provision. In apparent
disregard of the Lake exception, the court defined the word
decision" as including both the judgment and the opinion.2 This
definition would seem to require an opinion for any finding of con-
flict. In another case the court explained that an applicant for a writ
of certiorari based on conflict must specifically cite the prior deci-
sion which conflicts with the decision challenged.2 3 It is not enough
to allege general "conflict with the public policy of the State of
Florida. '24 In both instances the court continued to profess its inter-
est in strict construction of the conflict certiorari provision.
The abovementioned philosophical dichotomy became appar-
ent in Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota.25 A bare majority of the court
granted a writ of certiorari on the ground that the district court
opinion under attack (which followed a nineteen year old supreme
court holding on the same subject) conflicted with a statement in a
forty-three year old case which was "pure obiter dictum. 26 Three
21. The Lake court used the word decision in the context that an opinion must conflict
with a prior court of appeal or supreme court decision to invoke conflict certiorari jurisdiction.
22. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Branham, 104 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 1958). The court recognized
that to review a district court decision where there is no direct conflict amounts "in effect,
to allowing the petitioners two separate successive appeals at two separate and distinct
appellate levels; and this the constitution does not authorize." Id. at 358.
23. Karlin v. City of Miami Beach, 113 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1959).
24. Id. at 552.
25. 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960). Sunad concerned the question of whether aesthetic consid-
erations were a proper basis for the regulation of advertising signs where a Sarasota ordinance
allowed large signs at point of sale locations but limited sign size elsewhere. The entire court
agreed that a city could regulate signs on the basis of aesthetics but held the ordinance in
question discriminatory because it was not based on such considerations. See also Saf-T-
Clean, Inc. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 197 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1967).
26. 122 So. 2d at 613.
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of the seven justices argued that there was no ground for supreme
court jurisdiction since the allegedly conflicting statement was obi-
ter dictum. 7 Although not mentioned in the dissent, the fact that
the district court had followed a more recent supreme court case
should have been further indication that no jurisdiction existed. If
the earlier case had actually been on the same point of law, as
required for conflict jurisdiction to lie, it would have been overruled
effectively by the later case. This case presents an example of how
concern for individual litigants28 can be an excuse for expansion of
supreme court jurisdiction.
In Rosenthal v. Scott"5 the supreme court adopted the proce-
dure of sending a per curiam decision without opinion back to the
district court with a request to that court that it write an opinion
to enable the supreme court to determine if the decision conflicted
with any prior decisions." Two dissenters3 protested that the su-
preme court did not have authority to direct a lower court to write
an opinion but agreed on the desirability of having an opinion to
work with. At this stage of development, therefore, the court contin-
ued to act upon the premise that conflict was rare where there was
no opinion.
In Kyle v. Kyle32 the court ruled that an appellate court deci-
sion could not conflict with prior decisions where the decisional
point of law had been discussed but was not controlling. "If the two
cases are distinguishable in controlling factual elements or if the
points of law settled by the two cases are not the same, then no
conflict can arise." 3 This reasoning is difficult to reconcile with
Sunad where forty-three year old dicta provided grounds for con-
flict. In Sunad the court rationalized its action by calling it an
attempt to avoid confusion. Certainly a Kyle type of case could raise
as much confusion.
In Huguley v. Hall34 the court further expanded its conflict
jurisdiction. There the district court had affirmed the circuit court
27. Id.
28. Apparently the court unanimously agreed that the district court had erred.
29. 131 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1961).
30. This was a case of per curiam reversal without majority opinion where a concurring
opinion set out the facts. The court justified its action by reasoning that reversals should
always have opinions lest the court under review not understand its prescribed future course.
31. 131 So. 2d at 482-83 (O'Connell and Thornal, JJ., dissenting).
32. 139 So. 2d 885 (Fla. 1962).
33. Id. at 887. The point in question was whether an antenuptial agreement could be
deemed valid without the signatures of two witnesses. Prior decisions had held valid, for
various reasons, agreements which had been witnessed. The question of the necessity of
having signatures for validity, however, was one of first impression.
34. 157 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1963). See also Autrey v. Carroll, 240 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 1970).
[Vol. 32:435
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without opinion. There was, however, an exhaustive dissenting
opinion which summarized all the facts of the case. The supreme
court held that it could find conflict based on this dissent, or on the
Lake exception.
B. Foley
In 1965, some seven troubled years after the Lake decision, the
supreme court reexamined the question of whether a district court
decision without opinion is reviewable by conflict certiorari. The
case was Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc.35 and the result was a modifi-
cation of the Lake policy." The district court had refused to respond
to a request to explain its per curiam affirmance. The supreme court
found no practical difference between determining if conflict exists
in per curiam decisions or opinion decisions"7 and no difference in
the legal effect of the two. The majority held that the supreme court
"may review by conflict certiorari a per curiam judgment of affirm-
ance without opinion where an examination of the record proper
discloses that the legal effect of such per curiam affirmance is to
create conflict with a decision of this court or another district court
of appeal."38 The "record proper" was defined as "the written record
of the proceedings in the court under review except the report of the
testimony.""
In his dissent,4" Justice Thornal expressed concern that the
majority's holding would produce a flood of petitions for certiorari.4'
This would again overburden the court and would provide a means
for every litigant to attempt to secure a second hearing for his cause,
thus undermining the finality of the district courts."2 Justice Thor-
nal emphasized that if there is no opinion, there is no way to tell
on what issues the court based its ruling. In this situation the su-
preme court potentially could find conflict in points of law never
considered by the appellate court. 3
Generally the Foley court perceived only two alternatives to the
problems created by Lake: (1) a hard and fast rule against reviewing
per curiam decisions, and (2) the ruling it chose." The court did not
35. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
36. Id. at 225.
37. The court reasoned that eventually it would have to look at the record in any case.
38. 177 So. 2d at 225.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 231.
41. Id. at 234.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 233-34.
44. See id. at 229-31 (Drew, J., concurring).
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seem to consider the practical precedential effect of per curiam
affirmances.15 A ruling by the supreme court that these decisions
could not be reviewed for conflict would effect primarily the individ-
ual litigants but probably would not create confusion in the law of
the state. In this case, therefore, the court effectively rejected the
Ansin v. Thurston goal48 of limiting the grant of certiorari to cases
which would affect "decisions as precedents as opposed to adjudica-
tions of the rights of particular litigants."47 The three Foley dissen-
ters 8 recognized a lack of necessity for the majority's holding and
anticipated problems it would create.
One of the first results of Foley was district court refusal to
comply further with supreme court requests to explain any per cur-
iam decisions rendered to enable the high court to determine the
existence of conflict. In one instance an appellate court reasoned:
"to comply with the request would be to make an advocate of this
court if it should attempt to set forth the basis of its reasoning after
its jurisdiction has expired."'" This court recognized the need of the
supreme court to have such explanations; however, it felt relieved
from its responsibility of providing such information because after
Foley the supreme court could delve into the record for its own
information.5 0
In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Butler5 the supreme court took
Foley one step further. Notwithstanding that the district court had
issued a full opinion with its decision, the court saw fit to inspect
the record to determine whether a conflict existed. The district
court opinion did not speak to the point of law allegedly in conflict
with another district court ruling. Dissenting Chief Justice Thornal,
with whom Justice Thomas concurred, accused the majority of con-
Structing "another vehicle to enable [them] to follow one of two
rules of law"52 on which they wish to express an opinion. The dissen-
ters maintained that the holding allows the supreme court to "sua
sponte dig back through the trial record in an effort to pick up
something which. . . the District Court has allegedly overlooked."53
Two years after Foley the Supreme Court granted conflict
45. See text accompanying notes 117-120 infra.
46. See notes 15-17 supra, and accompanying text.
47. 101 So. 2d 808, 811 (Fla. 1958).
48. Justices Thornal, Thomas and O'Connell.
49. Hoisington v. Kulchin, 178 So. 2d 349, 351 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1965).
50. Id.
51. 190 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1966).
52. Id. at 320.
53. Id.
[Vol. 32:435
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certiorari in a case which demonstrated "the necessity for and
wisdom of the rule in Foley."54 Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. v.
Williams was tried under a contributory negligence statute held
unconstitutional by the high court in the interim between the trial
and appeal. The district court denied appellant's motions to amend
its assignment of errors to include the unconstitutionality of the
statute and to remand the case for new trial based on the decision
of unconstitutionality. It then affirmed the trial court result per
curiam and without opinion. 5 The supreme court had held re-
cently "that an appellate court is required to apply the law as it
existed at the time of the appeal.""6 Therefore, if the affirmance
were permitted to stand, it would be in direct conflict with the
holding of unconstitutionality and in direct contravention of the
aforementioned recent holding. Furthermore, a situation would be
created whereby some litigants would have the benefit of a recent
supreme court declaration of unconstitutionality and others would
not. Even Justice O'Connell, a Foley dissenter, concurred, opining
that this was an instance where the court should be able to look
behind an opinionless decision to resolve serious conflict.
Also in 1967 a unanimous court reaffirmed Sunad57 in holding
that conflict can be found in obiter dicta." In this instance the dicta
was located in the opinion under review. The court recognized that
the conflicting statements were dicta, granted certiorari, and pro-
ceeded to affirm the district court holding on grounds having noth-
ing to do with the conflict. In its own dicta the supreme court re-
solved the conflicting statements of law.5 Since the affirmance was
based on a point other than the conflicting one and the conflicting
point was unnecessary to the resolution of the case, one might ques-
tion the precedential value of the supreme court opinion and ask if
the substance of that opinion was not dicta itself.
Controversy over the interpretation of the conflict provision of
54. Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. Williams, 199 So. 2d 469, 471 (Fla. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968).
55. 189 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1966).
56. 199 So. 2d at 471 (citing Florida East Coast Ry. v. Rouse, 194 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1967);
Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Braz, 196 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 1967)).
57. See notes 25-28 supra, and accompanying text.
58. Hawkins v. Williams, 200 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1967).
59. In this case the appellate court held that no contributory negligence could be found
on the face of the complaint and reversed the circuit court order dismissing the complaint
for failure to state a cause of action. In pure dicta the appellate court went on to hold that
even if such contributory negligence was apparent in the allegations of the complaint, it must
be raised as a defense rather than as grounds for dismissal. This conflicted with several prior
district and supreme court holdings. Upon grant of certiorari, the supreme court agreed that
no contributory negligence could be found in the complaint. Therefore, it approved the
district court holding but resolved the conflict in dicta in favor of the prior cases.
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the Florida Constitution'" came to a head in Gibson v. Maloney."'
There the two dissenters maintained that the majority had based
its finding of conflict on a United States Supreme Court decision
rather than any Florida district or Supreme Court decision as con-
stitutionally required.2 They further maintained that the Florida
decisions cited for conflict were irrelevant to the questions at hand,
easily distinguished on their facts and, in fact, presented no conflict
at all. Furthermore, the majority relied on jury instructions as part
of the record proper. Dissenting, Justice Thornal complained that
the definition of record proper was highly uncertain and that he had
not before considered it to include jury instructions. 3 He lamented
that by expanding the definition of record proper the supreme
"[c]ourt is able to completely circumvent any jurisdictional issue
and go right to the merits of each case." 4 He voiced a concern that
if the court, by means of this expanded definition, continued to
permit an erosion of its limitations on conflict certiorari, Florida
would rapidly approach "the much decried allowance of 'two ap-
peals', which concerned the framers of our amended juridical article
when it was drafted in 1956."5
The Gibson v. Maloney dissents were the first of many. Retired
Justice Drew, in Fountainbleau Hotel Corp. v. Walters,6 criticized
the majority for finding conflict and opined that "the Constitution
enables this Court to harmonize the decisions of this and the Dis-
trict Courts of Appeal, not to correct erroneous decisions of the
latter." 7 Dissenting in Buck v. Lopez"6 Justice Adkins, joined by
Justice Ervin in citing Ansin v. Thurston, reminded the majority
that its "concern should be with the decision of the District Court
of Appeal as precedent as opposed to an adjudication of the rights
of the particular litigants."" These dissents indicated the continued
existence and vitality of the philosophical dichotomy in the Su-
60. FLA. CONST. art V, § 4(2) (1885, amended 1956) (current version at FLA. CONST. art
V, § 3(b)(3)).
61. 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1970).
62. 231 So. 2d 823, 830, 840 (Thornal, J. and Ervin, C.J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 832. For a comprehensive discussion of the controversy over the definition of
record proper see Comment, Establishing New Criteria for Conflict Certiorari In Per Curiam
District Court Decisions: A First Step Toward a Definition of Power, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 335
(1977); Note, Conflict Certiorari Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida: The "Record
Proper," 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 409 (1975).
64. 231 So. 2d at 833.
65. Id.
66. 246 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1971).
67. Id. at 566.
68. 250 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1971).
69. Id. at 9.
[Vol. 32:435
CONFLICT CERTIORARI
preme Court of Florida.
In 1973 the court took an "opportunity to comment on the
rationale of considering dissents when no other portion of the record
proper is presented for consideration other than the majority and
dissenting opinions."7 The court noted that when facts are set forth
in a majority opinion, precedentially they are considered to be the
accepted facts of the case. Facts set forth in a dissent are not given
such dignity. There is a presumption, however, that an appellate
judge who dissents would not intentionally try to mislead by using
inaccurate facts in his opinion. Consequently, the court held that
an attorney may file a petition for conflict certiorari based on facts
gleaned from the dissent even when there is a majority opinion.7 If
the party opposing certiorari uses facts from the majority opinion
to argue that there is no conflict, however, the validity of facts
stated by the majority would prima facie supersede those stated in
the dissent. The court warned that a petitioner for certiorari relying
on facts as set out in a dissent for conflict should buttress his posi-
tion with the use of other parts of the record proper and should
anticipate the effective use of a majority opinion, if any, against
him.7"
The limits of conflict certiorari jurisdiction were expanded qui-
etly in two subsequent cases. In Keller v. Keller73 the court found
conflict between a third district case and several prior district and
supreme court cases. The finding was noteworthy in that the subject
of the cases was the award of alimony, an area left principally to the
discretion of the trial court. Petitioner alleged that the award had
been inadequate and cited for conflict other factually similar cases
where awards had been greater.74 The supreme court compared the
award in the case under review with the other cases and apparently
failed to consider that potential abuse of discretion by the trial court
had already been considered at the district level. In cases where
awards are highly discretionary it is difficult to see how an award
in a single case can be found to conflict with another in the constitu-
tional sense or to have any disharmonious effect on the laws of the
State.
In Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Development Authority,75 the su-
70. Commerce Nat'l Bank v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 284 So. 2d 205, 207 (Fla. 1973)
(footnote omitted).
71. Id. at 207.
72. Id. at 208.
73. 308 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1974).
74. Id. at 107-08.
75. 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975).
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preme court, without acknowledging that it was doing so, expanded
its definition of record proper to include evidentiary exhibits which
were not part of the initial pleadings, orders or opinion of the case.
The court cited Foley7" for authority to consider the exhibits but
apparently failed to consider the Foley definition of what could be
examined to ascertain if conflict existed." This inconsistency was
identified by Justice Overton in his dissenting opinion where he
argued: "[c]learly, exhibits and depositions are not 'record pro-
per.' ''78
Focusing in on the controversy, Justice England's dissent in
State v. Embry7" accused the majority of "glossing over the jurisdic-
tional issue to reach the merits." 0 Conflict had been held to exist
between the case under review and two prior supreme court cases.8'
In fact there were important factual differences between the Embry
case and those with which it allegedly conflicted. The district court,
however, had applied the rules of law set out in the conflicting cases
to the facts at bar. 2 The grounds for conflict were quite unclear. 3
Justices England and Overton again protested the majority's
jurisdictional determination in AB CTC v. Morejon.8 ' There a find-
ing of conflict was based on parts of the record of a prior action
76. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
77. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
78. 315 So. 2d at 459.
79. 322 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1976).
80. Id. at 519.
81. All three cases concerned Florida's speedy trial rule. The circuit court had denied
Embry's motion to dismiss for failure to afford him a speedy trial on the grounds that
subsequent to requesting the speedy trial Embry had filed a motion to suppress. This, rea-
soned the court, showed that Embry was not prepared to go to trial as required by the
allegedly conflicting cases. The district court reversed, holding that the mere filing of a
motion to suppress does not indicate a defendant's unreadiness or unwillingness to go to trial.
The allegedly conflicting cases required a bona fide desire to go to trial and adequate prepara-
tion as prerequisites to demand a dismissal after speedy trial had been demanded. In both
cases the defendants had engaged in dilatory motions and discovery procedures subsequent
to requesting speedy trials.
82. See Nielson v. City of Sarasota, 117 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1960). In that case the court
held:
the principal situations justifying the invocation of our jurisdiction to review
decisions of Courts of Appeal because of alleged conflict are, (1) the announce-
ment of a rule of law which conflicts with a rule previously announced by this
Court, or (2) the application of a rule of law to produce a different result in a case
which involves substantially the same controlling facts as a prior case disposed
of by this court.
Id. at 734.
83. 322 So. 2d at 518. Justice Overton in a partial dissent expressed belief that no conflict
existed.
84. 324 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1975). For an excellent discussion of this case see 6 STErSON
INTRAMURAL L. REv. 15 (1976).
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which had been appended to petitioner's brief in the case at bar.
The dissenters emphasized that this could not have been foreseen
in the constitutional requirement of "direct" conflict or in the Foley
definition of record proper. 5 Justice England called for a re-
evaluation of Foley."8
The question of whether conflict could be found in a dissenting
opinion was raised again by Justice England in his concurring opin-
ion in Golden Loaf Bakery, Inc. v. Charles W. Rex Construction
Co. 7 The majority had ruled simply that it had no conflict jurisdic-
tion in the case. Since the district court affirmance was without
opinion but contained one judge's dissenting opinion, Justice Eng-
land took the opportunity to state clearly his objection to the use of
"dissent conflict" as a means for the supreme court to acquire juris-
diction. Unwilling "to ascribe to the dissenter the power to speak
for the unspoken majority, '" ' but noting that in the instant case the
dissent presented the only reviewable record proper,8 Justice Eng-
land inferred that to grant conflict certiorari based on matters set
forth in a dissent is unnecessary because of lack of precedential
effect and a dangerous erosion of the "last resort" character of the
district courts." It must be noted, however, that although four jus-
tices concurred in discharging the writ of certiorari, only Justice
Overton joined Justice England in his disapproval of "dissent con-
flict."
In National Airlines, Inc. v. Edwards,9 Justice England, again
joined in dissent by Justice Overton, accused the majority of seem-
ing "inclined to continue 'finding' conflict in those district court
decisions they do not like."92 In Edwards a passenger on a commer-
cial air liner hijacked to Cuba became ill and suffered permanent
injury as a result of ingestion of Cuban food and water. She sued
the airline company alleging negligence in failure to detect the hi-
jacker and failure to prevent the incident. The central issue in the
85. 324 So. 2d at 629.
86. Id. It is interesting to note that at about this time Justice England was speaking out
in favor of curtailing other forms of certiorari jurisdiction. In Lake Region Packing Ass'n v.
Furze, 327 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1976), where a district court had certified that its decision was of
great public interest but had failed to frame the question it wanted the supreme court to
decide, Justice England felt the high court was without power to frame the question itself
and had no jurisdiction absent the certification of an express question. 327 So. 2d at 217. The
majority disagreed.
87. 334 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1976) (England and Overton, JJ. concurring).
88. Id. at 587.
89. Id. at 586.
90. Id. at 586-87.
91. 336 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1976).
92. Id. at 548.
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case was whether the airline's negligence was the proximate and
foreseeable cause of the passenger's injuries. The trial court dis-
missed the complaint. Upon appeal, the district court reversed,
holding that the claim for damages was not so remote as to demand
dismissal. The cause was then appealed to the Supreme Court of
Florida, which granted certiorari on the grounds of conflict with two
previous district court opinions. In the Edwards case the district
court, in reversing, set forth the general rule governing remoteness
- the same rule which was followed in both of the cases allegedly
in conflict. In the prior cases the supreme court, in applying the
rule, found the claimed damages to be too remote and unforesee-
able. Similarly, in Edwards, the supreme court quashed the order
the district court and reinstated the dismissal of the case. Agreeing
with the result of the majority opinion, the dissenters protested that
the supreme court had no authority to intervene simply to express
an opinion on the application of accepted legal tests to a particular
set of facts. Neither the dissenters nor the majority pointed out that
the court's action in Edwards failed to fit into one of the two situa-
tions set out in Nielson v. City of Sarasota.3
Finally, in Mystan Marine, Inc. v. Harrington94 a majority of
the court, led by Justice England, reaffirmed Ansin v. Thurston"
and manifested a "concern with decisions as precedents as opposed
to adjudications of the rights of particular litigants."" Notwith-
standing recognition that the petitioner in the instant action had
been denied a "benefit. . . which a defendant in the identical legal
position [had been] able to obtain" 7 the court held that the dis-
trict court's denial without opinion of a writ of common law certior-
ari in the case had no precedential effect. Discussing possible alter-
native reasons for the denial of certiorari, the court acknowledged
"there is no means by which we, or anyone else, can determine
exactly what action the district court took."98 Since the decision had
no precedential effect, it could not create disharmony in the deci-
sional law of the state. Although the end result conflicted with a
prior decision, the court found that "the constitutional scope of
[its] jurisdiction prohibit[ed] [its] review."99
In City of Jacksonville v. Florida First National Bank'00 a writ
93. 117 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1960). For a discussion of this case see note 82 supra.
94. 339 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1976).
95. 101 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1958). See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
96. 339 So. 2d at 201 (quoting Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808, 811 (Fla. 1958)).
97. 339 So. 2d at 201.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 202.
100. 339 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1976).
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for certiorari was discharged with the concurrence of five justices.
Two justices'0' joined Justice England in rejecting the writ based on
the rationale of Nielson v. City of Sarasota. 0o They agreed that the
supreme court had no jurisdiction to review a district court's appli-
cation of a settled rule of law unless that application conflicted with
a prior application of the same rule to a case with substantially
similar facts. There had been no prior case with similar facts. It is
noteworthy that in his solitary dissent, Justice Boyd apparently
ignored the jurisdictional problem in the case and spoke only to the
merits.' 3 It is also interesting to ponder whether the denial of cer-
tiorari-at least by the two justices who did not join in Justice
England's opinion-could be attributed to the fact that fairness and
compassion seemed to be served by that denial.' 4
Joined by Justices Hatchett and Overton, Justice England
again registered his disapproval of the majority's method of granting
conflict certiorari in Williams v. State. '0 The district court had
affirmed the trial court without opinion, but a dissenting opinion
had been filed. Justice England reiterated his objection to "dissent
conflict."'06 Furthermore, he opined that there was no effective con-
flict of decisions. Most importantly, he pointed out that the statute
involved in the case producing the legal question which allegedly
required clarification had been repealed. For that reason alone Jus-
tice England thought certiorari should be denied. The only conse-
quence of resolving the conflict-if one existed-would be to the
immediate litigants. The "individual litigants versus the preceden-
tial effect" question continued to pose a difficult situation.
A unified court ordered dismissal of the petition for writ of
certiorari in Florida Greyhound Owners & Breeders Association v.
West Flagler Associates.'°7 The court, however, was not unified in
the reasons for dismissal: Justice England and Chief Justice Over-
ton wrote concurring opinions. The two agreed that "the time
[had] indeed come to recede from Foley and its ill-conceived at-
tempt to retain the last word on every matter brought to the Florida
101. Chief Justice Overton and Justice Sundberg.
102. 117 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1960).
103. 339 So. 2d at 634-36.
104. The action was one against a municipality to remunerate two abused children for
their injuries caused by the alleged negligence of the municipality. The trial court had dis-
missed the complaint and the district court had reinstated it. Therefore, a denial of certiorari
was effectively a decision favoring the children.
105. 340 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1976).
106. See Golden Loaf Bakery, Inc. v. Charles W. Rex Constr. Co., 334 So. 2d 585 (Fla.
1976). See also text accompanying notes 87-91 supra.
107. 347 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1977).
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appellate courts.' ' 0 Justice England reasoned that Foley was based
on the assumption that a per curiam affirmance is a tacit adoption
of the trial court's reasoning on a point of law. He continued,
"[b]oth the Second and Third District Courts of Appeal have ex-
pressly stated that trial judges can make no assumptions as to the
basis on which a per curiam affirmance without opinion is ren-
dered,' 0 9 and the supreme court has agreed with such statements.10
"To my mind, there is no possible way that a district court's affirm-
ance without opinion can create decisional disharmony in the juris-
prudence of this state sufficient to warrant our attention.""' Justice
England stated that the only reason for the supreme court to review
per curiam affirmances is to provide justice to the individual liti-
gants. The constitution assigns that responsibility to the district
courts. Decisions without opinion have no lasting effect on the
state's law. Hence, along with increasing the burden on the supreme
court, the Foley decision has seriously undermined the district
courts' finality. In a final note, Justice England, apparently frus-
trated by his brothers' refusal to recede from Foley, addressed him-
self to the 1977 Constitutional Revision Commission and asked it to
abandon the present grants of supreme court jurisdiction in favor
of the system of granting certiorari used in the United States Su-
preme Court."2 The implication is that as long as the court is grant-
ing certiorari in a highly discretionary fashion, its constitutional
grant of power should specifically give it such discretion.
C. The Present
The Supreme Court of Florida has developed a system of grant-
ing writs of certiorari that is confused and controversial. The basic
question that must be asked is whether the function of the state's
highest court is to ensure that individual litigants obtain justice, to
pass judgment on all matters that it deems important or to adhere
strictly to its constitutional function of acting only when there is
serious decisional disharmony in the state. Justices England and
Overton obviously favor a restriction of grants of conflict certiorari
to cases where the decisional conflict would have great and lasting
impact. Justices Adkins and Boyd apparently favor liberal grants
108. Id. at 409.
109. Id. at 410-11 & n. 9 (citing Acme Specialty Corp. v. City of Miami, 292 So. 2d 379,
380 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974) and Schooley v. Judd, 149 So. 2d 587, 590 (Fla. 2d Dist.), rev'd on
other grounds, 158 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1963)).
110. Id. (citing State ex rel. Ranalli v. Johnson, 277 So. 2d 24, 25 (Fla. 1973)).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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of writs for conflict certiorari based on conflict found in dissenting
opinions and obiter dicta,"' misapplication of law to facts"4 and
expansive definitions of the record proper."' The general positions
of the other justices are uncertain. There is some indication, how-
ever, that Justices England and Overton are beginning to influence
the others."' There also seems to be a reduction in the number of
certiorari petitions granted." '
The only thing about conflict certiorari that is certain is that a
petitioner for a writ cannot know in advance what his chances of
success will be. Jurisdictional determinations seem to be very
subjective. In fact the supreme court uses a great deal of discretion,
and very few opinions set guidelines in the process of granting cer-
tiorari.
III. REMAINING QUESTIONS
Solutions to this general uncertainty can be made in decisional
pronouncements or in changes in the Florida Appellate Rules. A
revision of the constitutional provision which grants jurisdiction to
the supreme court also might be appropriate. General questions
which remain troublesome are: (1) whether a decision without opin-
ion is precedential and should be a basis for a grant cof conflict
certiorari; (2) how to define the "record proper" which may be con-
sulted in ascertaining whether conflict exists; (3) whether the con-
flict necessary to invoke jurisdiction must in be controlling points
of law in both cases, that is, necessary to the result and not merely
dicta or part of a dissenting opinion; (4) whether conflict certiorari
should be granted when the ultimate question is moot and not likely
to produce further litigation or when the statute which is central to
the case has been repealed; and (5) whether diverse applications of
the same rule of law to different sets of facts can be grounds for
granting a writ of certiorari based on decisional conflict.
Hereafter some alternative ways of handling these problems
will be discussed and suggestions will be made.
113. See Williams v. State, 340 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1976); Golden Loaf Bakery, Inc. v.
Charles W. Rex Constr. Co., 334 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1976) (dissent conflict); Ciongoli v. State,
337 So. 2d 780 (1976) (obiter dicta).
114. See National Airlines v. Edwards, 336 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1976); State v. Embry, 322
So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1975).
115. See AB CTC v. Morejon, 324 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1975); Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev.
Auth., 315 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1975) (per curiam); Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 951 (1970).
115.1. See Justice Hatchett's discharge of a writ of certiorari where conflict was based
on dicta in Ciongoli v. State, 337 So. 2d 780 (1976).
116. Comment, supra note 63, at 351 n. 124.
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A. Is a Decision Without Opinion Precedential?
Professor Karl N. Llewellyn noted that legal "precedent con-
sists in [a court] doing over again under similar circumstances
substantially what has been done by [it] or [its] predecessor be-
fore,""' 7 and "the foundation . . . of precedent is the official ana-
logue." ' 8 Llewellyn emphasized the importance of maintaining re-
cords of prior cases where the solution of a problem takes a great
deal of time and effort. The product of that time and effort, if
preserved in records, can be applied to similar problems in the
future without further expenditure of effort and time. The lawyer
can search "the records for convenient cases to support his point,
[press] upon the court what it has already done before, [and capi-
talize] the human drive toward repetition by finding, by making
explicit, by urging, the prior cases.""' 9
However, if an opinion consists of three words, "Per Curiam.
Affirmed.", it is difficult for a lawyer to use it in the manner antici-
pated. A use of the decision as precedent would require a detailed
examination of the record of the case. Even then only sheer guess
work could establish the exact reasoning behind the result. For this
purpose it is difficult to see how such a decision could have any
effect on the jurisprudence of the state. A researcher could never
understand a particular case absent coincidental familiarity with it.
Yet a majority of the Supreme Court of Florida declines to overrule
the case which allows it to find conflict in per curiam affirmances
without opinion. The effect of this is two-fold: individual litigants
receive a second appellate hearing of their Cases, and the supreme
court caseload expands. These are two results sought to be avoided
through the development of our modern court system.
As to whether a decision without opinion should invoke conflict
jurisdiction, three justices of the Supreme Court of Missouri opined
wisely: "The Court of Appeals does not go contrary to the previous
rulings of this court unless it states a proposition of law contrary to
what this court has held."'' 0 This rule could be adopted by the
Supreme Court of Florida.
B. How Should the Record Proper Be Defined?
Since it appears that the supreme court will not halt its practice
117. K. LLEWELLYN, BRAMBLE BUSH 64 (1930).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 65.
120. State ex rel. Union Biscuit Co. v. Becker, 316 Mo. 865, 875, 293 S.W. 783, 787 (1927)
(White, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
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of finding conflict where there is no written opinion, the court at
least should clarify once and for all the definition and limitation of
what it will consider in ascertaining if conflict exists. Once thought
to include only the opinions, orders and pleadings filed in a case,
the record proper has been extended recently to include evidentiary
exhibits and documents filed in a prior lawsuit.'
In Missouri, where the grant of jurisdiction to the supreme
court to resolve conflicts resembles that of Florida,' the supreme
court will not find conflict unless it appears on the face of the alleg-
edly conflicting opinions or documents referred to therein.' Since
Florida's appellate courts do not always write opinions and the su-
preme court has neither seen fit nor had the authority to require
them to do so, the high court might consider a rule requiring the
district court to furnish it, on request, with a list of documents
pertinent to its decision. This would not put the appellate court in
the position of having to defend a decision it had already rendered
and should not be unduly burdensome. On the other hand this rule
might minimize the blind groping the supeme court presently must
do in order to determine if a case without opinion presents a conflict.
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of Texas flatly
refuses to look behind an opinion in a case to see if conflict exists.'
Texas has a means for resolving conflict similar to that of Florida
and Missouri.' Its appellate courts do not always write opinions
after examining lower court decisions for error. Nonetheless, absent
the decisional mischief of the Lake exception and Foley, Texas does
not have the problem of handling alleged conflicts created where no
opinion is written. It simply does not recognize the possibility.
121. See note 115 supra.
122. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 10 (1945, amended 1970) provides for resolution of decisional
conflict among the courts of Missouri by the supreme court. The case under review must be
certified to the supreme court by an appellate court unless it involves a question of general
interest or importance.
123. Knorp v. Thompson, 175 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1943); Kansas City Gas Co. v. Shain,
132 S.W.2d 1015 (Mo. 1939); Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Haid, 18 S.W.2d 478 (Mo. 1929);
State ex rel. Union Biscuit Co. v. Becker, 316 Mo. 865, 293 S.W. 783 (1927); State ex rel.
Vulgamott v. Trimble, 300 Mo. 92, 253 S.W. 1014 (1923).
124. Boxwell v. Ladehoff, 400 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1966); Torrez v. Maryland Cas. Co., 363
S.W.2d 235 (Tex. 1962); Dockum v. Mercury Ins. Co., 135 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1940); see Sales & Cliff, Jurisdiction in the Texas Supreme Court and Courts of Civil Appeals,
26 BAYLOR L. REV. 501 (1974).
125. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 3; TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN., art. 1728 (Vernon). Texas law
provides the supreme court with appellate jurisdiction of all cases "in which one of the courts
of appeal holds differently from a prior decision of another court of appeal or of the Supreme
Court upon any question of law material to a decision of the case." Id. (emphasis added).
See'also State ex rel. Miles v. Ellison, 296 Mo. 151, 190 S.W. 274 (1916).
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C. Can There Be Conflict in Dicta, Dissents or Other Parts of the
Opinion which Are Not Controlling?
If this court should establish the policy of requiring every obser-
vation made by the Court of Civil Appeals in the course of an
opinion to be certified [to the supreme court] if there seemed to
be a conflict with observations made by Courts of Civil Appeals
in other cases, notwithstanding they do not affect the [result]
of the case, then we apprehend its docket would be cluttered with
a great deal of unnecessary litigation.'6
With this ruling the Supreme Court of Texas took a hard and
fast position against finding conflict in any parts of opinions except
those which are legally controlling and necessary to the result.'27 A
statement which is immaterial to the decision in a case cannot
create conflict even if it is directly contrary to statements made in
a prior decision.'
The United States Supreme Court employs a similar standard:
"[T]here must be a real conflict on the same matter of law or fact,
not merely an inconsistency in dicta or in the general principles
utilized.""'
In Sunad,130 a case which has not been overruled, 130.1 the Su-
preme Court of Florida reaffirmed its policy of taking jurisdiction
of a case in order to correct conflicting dicta. In a similar vein, the
court has not been adverse to finding conflict on the basis of a
dissenting opinion. 131 This again raises the questions: What possible
precedential value could such statements have, and how could they
cause "real and embarrassing conflict"? If the court saw its function
solely as that of a conflict resolver it could not take jurisdiction in
such instances. Surely the fact that it acquires jurisdiction based on
dicta and/or dissents might be considered an indication that the
supreme court sees itself as the true court of last resort of the state.
As previously suggested, the court should adopt a policy or
appellate rule to the effect that conflict, to invoke the court's juris-
diction, must appear on the face of the majority opinion, must be
necessary to the result of the case and must be in a controlling point
126. Benson v. Jones, 296 S.W. 865, 867 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927).
127. See Ziegelmeyer v. Pelphrey, 125 S.W.2d 1038 (Tex. 1939); Sales.& Cliff, note 105
supra.
128. Nesbett v. Nesbett, 428 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. 1968); Williams v. Williams, 325 S.W.2d
682 (Tex. 1959).
129. STERN & GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, § 4.3 at 154 (4th ed. 1969).
130. 122 So. 2d 611, 613 (Fla. 1960). See also notes 25-28 & 57 supra, and accompanying
text.
130.1. See Ciongoli v. State, 337 So. 2d 780 (1976).
131. Williams v. State, 340 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1976).
[Vol. 32:435
CONFLICT CERTIORA RI
of law. In this way, much of the court's overburdening would be
alleviated and the probabilities of obtaining a writ for conflict cer-
tiorari clarified.
There are those who would argue that such a ruling would be
unjust for certain individual litigants, but it must be pointed out
that no court is infallible. Even the supreme court occassionally
errs. There are ample provisions in the appellate courts for rehear-
ings and other means of ensuring that justice is done. Hence, allow-
ing the supreme court to grant a second appellate hearing by finding
conflict in statements with no precedential value is not necessarily
a guarantee that "better" justice will be achieved. Furthermore, the
district courts of appeal were constitutionally designed to be Flor-
ida's courts of last resort.
D. Should Conflict Certiorari Be Granted to Resolve Moot
Problems?
There are those who would argue that the conflict is not worthy
of resolution where the question presented will not arise again. This
occurs in a situation where a case is decided, the decision legiti-
mately conflicts with another decision, but the central and conflict-
ing question is moot or about to become moot at the time of petition
for certiorari. This could be true in a case based on a statute that
has been repealed or where a decision affects a class of litigants all
of whose rights have been adjudicated already. Again the court is
faced with the possibility that an individual litigant will be treated
unfairly. This must be weighed against the costs and benefits to
society of a second appellate review by the supreme court. Ob-
viously, society's benefits from the review would be limited to bene-
fits received by the protesting litigant. Since the question will not
arise again, disharmony in the decisional law should not be a con-
cern.
132
Recently in Williams v. State'33 the Supreme Court of Florida
found conflict in a case based on a statute which had been repealed
subsequent to the trial of the case. The conflicting question in the
case would not arise again, but the court apparently did not see this
as a reason to deny the writ.
This must be contrasted with the policy of the Supreme Court
of the United States. There the conflicting issue must be vital before
certiorari will be granted.'1 R. L. Stern, a devoted scholar of the
132. It is important to confine this rationale to cases where the moot question is very
narrow and probably would not be applied to analogous situations.
133. 340 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1976).
134. Stern, Denial of Certiorari Despite a Conflict, 66 HARV. L. REv. 465 (1953).
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Supreme Court, has concluded that if a statute had expired the
Court very probably would not hear a case based on it, notwith-
standing that there were a substantial number of cases pending on
that very issue.'35 Of course if the case had some independent im-
portance the Court would hear it.' Furthermore, the United States
Supreme Court usually will not base certiorari on conflict if the case
under review allegedly conflicts with a case that is very old. 37
These standards" used by the high court of our nation appear to
be sound ones. The highly discretionary nature of its grant of juris-
dictional power 3 requires that it exercise restraint in accepting
cases for hearing and hear only the most important, a model the
Florida Supreme Court might well follow.
E. Can There Be Conflict in Cases Which Do Not Have
Substantially Similar Facts?
When a case is factually one of first impression it is the function
of the trial and district courts to see that the law of the state is
properly applied to the unique facts at bar. There is no constitu-
tional provision in Florida for the review of a district court opinion
based on unique facts. In a recent decision, however, the supreme
court saw fit to review an application of settled law to a unique set
of facts' 3' on the ground that the application conflicted with that in
a prior case. In fact there had never been a case that even remotely
resembled the case at bar factually. Additionally, the rule of law
dealt with remoteness of damages - traditionally a highly discre-
tionary area.
It is clearly understood that each time a rule of law is applied
to a new set of facts it creates a slightly different precedent.' It is
somewhat difficult to understand how the application of a rule to
an entirely diverse and new set of facts can create conflict, for there
is no precedent with which the application can conflict.
The Supreme Court of Texas has held that for conflict to arise
"[t]he rulings must be so far upon the same state of facts that the
decision of one case is necessarily conclusive of the decision in the
135. Id. But cf. Tinder v. United States, 193 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1951), rev'd on other
grounds, 345 U.S. 565 (1953).
136. See Watson v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 56 (9th Cir. 1952), aff'd, 345 U.S. 544 (1953)
(although statute was no longer in force and could create no further litigation, there were fifty-
five cases pending on the same point of law involving millions of dollars).
137. STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 129, at 157.
138. See U.S. Sup. CT. R. 19.
139. National Airlines v. Edwards, 336 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1976).
140. LLEWELLYN, supra note 117, at 61-64.
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other."'"' That court has ruled that two decisions based on slightly
different facts cannot be in conflict so long as the same rule of law
has been applied."' The Supreme Court of the United States also
denies certiorari on the basis of conflict when the asserted conflict
arises from "differences in states of fact, and not in the application
of a principle of law."" 3
Florida, in Nielson v. City of Sarasota,' has recognized that if
the application of a settled rule of law to a set of facts is to create
conflict, the facts must be substantially the same as those in the
prior case."5 Of course substantially the same is a term of art and
it is in its interpretation that the controversy lies.
IV. CONCLUSION
Potential changes as just discussed would require only the
agreement and inclination of the supreme court for their execution.
Indeed they reflect necessary changes in attitude that a majority of
the court is apparently not prepared to make-either because it sees
no need for them or because it does not agree with their thrust.
There are two other alternatives that must be discussed. They
both would involve substantial changes in the constitutional grant
of jurisdiction to the supreme court. The first retains the restrictive
nature of the jurisdictional grant and the second replaces it with
total discretion.
The first would involve a scheme whereby conflict certiorari
could not issue unless at least one judge on an appellate court panel
would certify that conflict may exist between its present holding
and a prior holding of a district court or the supeme court. If no
judge would so certify and the supreme court found the case to be
of great importance, it could take the case only for the purpose of
resolving the conflict (i.e., either affirming the district court deci-
sion or quashing it with instructions to modify the district court
decision). In this latter instance the supreme court could consider
only the conflicting point and not the entire case while in the former
the court would furnish a complete review.
In effect, such a system would resolve much of the uncertainty
in our present system. The Ohio and Missouri systems are similar
141. International Harvester Co. v. Stedman, 324 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. 1959) (quoting
Garritty v. Rainey, 112 Tex. 369, 247 S.W. 825, 827 (Tex. 1923)); West Disinfecting Co. v.
Trustees of Crosby Indep. School Dist., 143 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. 1940).
142. Boxwell v. Ladehoff, 400 S.W.2d 303 (Tex. 1966).
143. Wisconsin Elec. Co. v. Dumore Co., 282 U.S. 813 (1931).
144. 117 So. 2d 731, 734 (Fla. 1960).
145. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Bell, 113 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1959).
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to that suggested."' The court of appeals is in an excellent position
to recognize conflict as the court most familiar with the record of
the case before it. Petitioners could allege conflict on petition for
rehearing and/or certification. Since certification by only one judge
of the three that sit on appeals would be required and since the
constitution would require certification if there might be a conflict,
the chances are excellent that a very high percentage of true con-
flicts would reach the supreme court. The problems created by
Foley might be avoided through such a plan. Furthermore, the su-
preme court would maintain a degree of flexibility through the latter
part of its jurisdictional grant. Certainly the court would not have
the burden of screening as many petitions for conflict certiorari.
That would be handled at the district level, where the task would
not be so burdensome.
The other alternative is for Florida to adopt the federal plan for
grants of certiorari jurisdiction. Supreme Court Rule 19,
"Considerations governing review on certiorari," states simply: "A
review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion, and will be granted only where there are special
and important reasons therefor.""' 7 The rule goes on to list potential
but not controlling considerations for determining whether a case is
of such character that certiorari should be granted. In short, the
United States Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to review, at some time and in some manner, all cases
in lower federal courts . . . in which the determination of a ques-
tion as to the meaning or effect of a federal statute. . . constitu-
tional provision, right, or immunity is essential to the decision
and in which such a question is properly raised. 4 '
The rule imposes no limits as to parties, subject matter, etc.
There are no requirements of certification by the appellate court
and the Court is not obliged to take any case on certiorari. There
are no true guidelines,"' but the Court has held that its certiorari
powers were "not conferred . . . merely to give the defeated party
in the Circuit Court of Appeals another hearing."'
Such wide discretion would appear, at first, to be unduly bur-
densome. Certainly, more petitions for certiorari would be filed
under such a plan. As a practical consequence, however, the Florida
146. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 10 (1945, amended 1970); OHIo CONST. art. IV, § 3(B)(4).
147. U.S. SuP. CT. R. 19.
148. STERN & GRESSMAN, supra note 110, at 23-24.
149. Id. at 153.
150. Id. at 149 (quoting Magnum Co. v, Coty, 262 U.S. 159, 163 (1923)).
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justices would have to be more selective in the cases they took.
There would be more screening of cases to be done. Yet according
to Justice Brennan the effectiveness of a court is enhanced by such
a screening process.'5' It is by exposure to a wide variety of cases that
a judge can keep his fingers on the pulse of societal change.
Justice England has indicated support for such a change.'52 Yet
Justice Overton, who concurred with Justice England in calling for
a change, later stated he thought no change in Florida's judicial
article was necessary.1
Perhaps Justice Overton's avowed desire to keep the same judi-
cial article is an indication that he sees change coming from within
the court. If this is true the litigants of Florida would applaud it.
For after two decades of wandering through jurisdictional mazes it
is only fair that the path to conflict certiorari be cleared and marked
once and for all.
151. Justice Brennan Calls National Court of Appeals Proposal "Fundamentally Unnec-
essary and Ill Advised," 59 A.B.A.J. 835, 836 (1973).
152. Florida Greyhound Owners & Breeders Ass'n. v. West Flagler Assoc., 347 So. 2d 408,
412 (Fla. 1977).
153. Miami Herald, July 10, 1977, § E, at 8, Col. 1.
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